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Articles 
JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS AND 
INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION:  
JUSTIFICATIONS AND RISKS 
by 
Christopher E. Smith* and Cheryl D. Lema** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The reelection of President George W. Bush in 2004 coincided with 
the announcement that Chief Justice William Rehnquist was diagnosed 
with thyroid cancer at the age of eighty.1  Based on the chemotherapy 
and radiation treatments prescribed for Rehnquist, medical experts 
speculated that Rehnquist had the most serious form of thyroid cancer.2  
News reports predicted Rehnquist’s “imminent departure” from the 
Court and speculated about who President Bush might appoint as a 
replacement.3  One rumored replacement for Rehnquist as Chief Justice 
is Justice Clarence Thomas who, according to his biographer, has been 
interviewed by Bush administration officials as a possible choice for 
elevation to Chief Justice.4  Because Thomas has been named, along with 
Justice Antonin Scalia, as one of the justices that President Bush most 
admires,5 it is possible that the next Chief Justice could come from 
                                                 
*  Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University.  A.B., Harvard University, 
1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984; Ph.D., 
University of Connecticut, 1988. 
**  B.A., University of California-Los Angeles, 2003; M.S., Michigan State University, 
expected 2005. 
1 Bill Mears et al., Rehnquist Has Thyroid Cancer Surgery, CNN.COM, Oct. 25, 2004, 
available at www-cgi.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/25/rehnquist. 
2 Neil A. Lewis & Linda Greenhouse, New Round of Speculation About Rehnquist’s 
Farewell, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, at 10.   
3 Id. 
4 Anne Gearan, Thomas Could Be Next Chief Justice, Writer Says, DETROIT FREE PRESS, 
Aug. 7, 2004, available at http://www.freep.com/news/nw/thomas7e_20040807.htm. 
5 Michael McGough, Bush Has a Chance to Remake High Court, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2004, available at www.post-gazette.com/pg/04311/407789.stm. 
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among the Court’s most conservative sitting justices.6  Thomas may be 
an especially intriguing choice for Bush because he is the only Rehnquist 
Court Justice below the age of sixty, and thus he may be able to serve on 
the Court for many years to come.7 
In light of Thomas’s prominence as a potential Chief Justice and as 
the current justice who may have the longest term of service yet ahead of 
him, there is good reason to examine Thomas’s judicial philosophy and 
decisions.  In this Article, I look closely at one of Thomas’s key opinions 
concerning deprivations of liberty and consider its implications in light 
of Thomas’s opinions on related issues. 
Thomas prides himself on his fealty to the intentions of the 
Constitution’s framers in order to, in his words, “fulfill our 
constitutionally assigned role of giving full effect to the mandate of the 
Framers without infusing the constitutional fabric with our own political 
views.”8  In his opinions, Thomas consistently advocates interpretation 
of the Constitution according to the intentions of the document’s 
authors.9  Thomas describes the Supreme Court as “bound by the text of 
the Constitution and by the intent of those who drafted and ratified it.”10  
Critics of original intent jurisprudence have illuminated many of its 
problems, including the difficulty of identifying a single intended 
                                                 
6 Scholars’ analyses of Thomas’s performance on the Supreme Court frequently note his 
commitment to conservative philosophies and outcomes.  For example, Professor Mark 
Graber observes that “[n]o good reason exists why [Thomas] believes conservative 
historians when historians clash or why he discards originalism completely when that 
philosophy is hostile to certain conservative interests.”  Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas 
and the Perils of Amateur History, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE:  UNDERSTANDING THE COURT 
DYNAMIC 71 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003).  Graber’s analysis concludes that “[w]hat unites 
Thomas’s important concurring and dissenting opinions in constitutional cases is his 
commitment to conservative or libertarian results rather than a commitment to any 
particular theory of the judicial function.” Id. at 77.  In addition to scholars’ substantive 
assessments of his opinions, Thomas’s conservatism is evidenced by empirical studies that 
show him to be one of the justices least likely to support individuals’ claims of right.  See 
Christopher E. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Justice:  An Empirical Assessment, 19 J. 
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 161, 171 (2003). 
7 Thomas was born in 1948.  Graber, supra note 6, at 71. 
8 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
9 See Christopher E. Smith, Bent on Original Intent:  Justice Thomas Is Asserting a Distinct 
and Cohesive Vision, 82 A.B.A.J. 48, 48 (Oct. 1996) (“Thomas consistently advocates the strict 
application of key tools for interpreting the Constitution:  its text and history.  Thomas’ 
opinions are replete with references to the original intent of the Constitution’s Framers, 
English common law, and Anglo-American legal traditions.”). 
10 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 370-71 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
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meaning of each phrase to use as the definitive interpretation.11  
Moreover, Thomas regularly demonstrates his disregard for historical 
scholarship that runs counter to interpretations that support his desired 
outcomes12 so that, ultimately, “[h]istory guides only some of his judicial 
opinions.”13  Despite these flaws and inconsistencies in Thomas’s judicial 
philosophy, he can be characterized as “espousing an interpretive 
approach” that emphasizes obedience to the framers’ values and 
intentions.14  As he seeks to carry out his version of the framers’ vision, 
Thomas’s opinions can be assessed both in terms of their impact on the 
lives of individual human beings and in terms of their consistency with 
his other decisions and with the framers’ desire to protect the value of 
liberty. 
II.  THE HAMDI CASE 
An important test of Thomas’s view of the Constitution and its 
meaning for governmental power and individual liberty arose in the case 
of a U.S. citizen who was taken into custody in Afghanistan during 
American military action against the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Judith A. Baer, The Fruitless Search for Original Intent, in JUDGING THE 
CONSTITUTION:  CRITICAL ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 59 (Michael W. McCann & 
Gerald L. Houseman eds., 1989). 
So no jurisprudence of original intention is possible, because original 
intention is undiscoverable.  We can and should go to the primary 
sources to learn about the origins of the Constitution, but the past is 
something we can only learn about and learn from, not learn per se.  
The records are too incomplete, and the nature of lawmaking too 
imprecise, to enable us to discover original meaning. 
Id. 
12 See Jeffrey Rosen, Moving On, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 29 & May 6, 1996, at 73. 
[Thomas] has shown little familiarity with the most recent scholarship 
about Reconstruction Republicans and the limited scope of their color-
blind vision.  This scholarship, embraced by liberal and conservative 
legal historians, suggests that Thomas is wrong to insist that the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was intended to forbid 
racial discrimination in all circumstances . . . . [I]n 1868, when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, [the rights it included] were not 
clearly understood to include the right to attend desegregated schools, 
or the right to receive federal contracts, or the right to vote.  Thomas is 
trapped, in short, between his moral commitment to a color-blind 
Constitution and an interpretative methodology that compels him to 
reject it. 
Id. 
13 Graber, supra note 6, at 88. 
14 Smith, supra note 9, at 48. 
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organization in 2001, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.15  This was one of three related 
cases heard by the Supreme Court.  Another of the cases concerned 
hundreds of non-U.S. citizens labeled as “unlawful combatants” and 
placed in indefinite, incommunicado detention at the U.S. Naval base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.16  The third case concerned an American 
arrested inside the United States and held incommunicado at a military 
jail.17 
A. The Other Justices’ Opinions 
Yaser Esam Hamdi grew up in Saudi Arabia and was captured in 
Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance military forces, Taliban opponents 
who cooperated with American personnel during fighting to take control 
of the country.18  The U.S. government declared that Hamdi was an 
“enemy combatant” and thereby ineligible for the legal protection that 
the Geneva Conventions provide for soldiers in countries’ regular 
armies.19  When placed in custody of American officials, Hamdi was sent 
initially to the detention facility at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba; however, when it was discovered that he was a U.S. citizen 
by virtue of being born in Louisiana during a time period when his 
parents resided in the United States, he was transferred to a military jail 
in South Carolina.20  The government claimed that the “enemy 
combatant” label that it applied to Hamdi “justifies holding him in the 
United States indefinitely—without formal charges or proceedings—
unless and until [the government] makes the determination that access to 
counsel or further process is warranted.”21  Thus, the government 
asserted that it had the authority to hold a U.S. citizen incommunicado 
for an indefinite time period without the provision of any legal rights or 
access to the courts. 
Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the 
U.S. District Court appointed a federal public defender to represent 
                                                 
15 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004).  In the weeks following the terror attacks on September 11, 
2001, against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States and allied 
countries invaded Afghanistan after the Taliban government refused to act against al 
Qaeda leaders living in their country.  Julian Gearing, The Next Front, ASIA WEEK (Nov. 23, 
2001), available at www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/dateline/0,8782,184614,00. 
html. 
16 Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004). 
17 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004). 
18 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635. 
19 Id. at 2636-38. 
20 Id. at 2636. 
21 Id. 
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Hamdi and ordered that Hamdi be permitted to meet with the attorney.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that decision 
and order.22  When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, it 
held “that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in 
the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process demands that a 
citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a 
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention 
before a neutral decisionmaker.”23  Justice Sandra O’Connor’s plurality 
opinion, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Anthony 
Kennedy and Stephen Breyer, announcing the judgment of the Court 
noted “‘the risk of erroneous deprivation’ of a detainee’s liberty interest” 
if the government were permitted to have absolute control over 
determining a detainee’s status and preventing any contact with courts 
and the outside world.24 
Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
concurred in part, dissented in part, and concurred in the judgment.25  
The concurring opinion disagreed with O’Connor’s conclusion that the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), a resolution 
passed by Congress after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, 
granted the government the authority to detain Hamdi.26  According to 
Souter, “[t]he Government has failed to demonstrate that the Force 
Resolution authorizes the detention complained of here even on the facts 
the Government claims.  If the Government raises nothing further than 
the record now shows, the Non-Detention Act27 entitles Hamdi to be 
released.”28  The Non-Detention Act states that “[n]o citizen shall be 
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant 
to an Act of Congress.”29 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice John 
Paul Stevens, argued that the government was obligated to prosecute 
detained U.S. citizens for alleged crimes and accord them full legal 
protections under the Bill of Rights.30  Justice Scalia, who agrees with 
                                                 
22 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002). 
23 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635. 
24 Id. at 2648. 
25 Id. at 2652 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
26 Id. at 2653 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
27 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000) (citation added). 
28 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2653 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
29 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
30 Id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Thomas in most cases31 and who also advocates the importance of 
the framers’ intentions,32 emphasized the value of liberty when he 
concluded that “[t]he very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon 
system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite 
imprisonment at the will of the Executive.”33  Justice Scalia noted that 
The Federalist Papers quoted a famous passage from Blackstone that 
demonstrated the central importance of individual liberty:  “Of great 
importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty:  for if 
once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison 
arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper . . . there would 
soon be an end of all other rights and immunities.”34 
B. Justice Thomas’s Opinion 
The three different opinions described in the foregoing section 
indicate that the justices were divided in their assessments of the 
appropriate reasoning for the issues presented by Hamdi.  However, a 
closer examination reveals that the eight justices involved in all three 
opinions—plurality, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and 
dissenting—agreed on the fundamental issue concerning Hamdi’s liberty 
interest.  All eight justices agreed that the executive branch lacks the 
authority to hold U.S. citizens indefinitely in incommunicado detention 
without any constitutional rights or access to the courts.  By contrast, 
Justice Thomas stood out all alone, in sharp contrast even with his usual 
philosophical allies, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia,35 by 
endorsing virtually unfettered executive authority to deprive U.S. 
citizens of liberty indefinitely and without any proof of wrongdoing.  
According to Thomas, Hamdi’s “detention falls squarely within the 
Federal Government’s war powers, and we lack the expertise and 
capacity to second-guess that decision.”36 
Justice Thomas did not explicitly endorse inherent presidential 
authority to detain American citizens indefinitely in all circumstances.  
                                                 
31 For example, Justices Scalia and Thomas agreed in more than ninety percent of the 
Supreme Court’s civil rights and liberties decisions during Thomas’s first five terms on the 
Court.  Christopher E. Smith, Clarence Thomas:  A Distinctive Justice, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1, 4 (1997). 
32 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
33 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2661 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
34 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *132-33). 
35 Empirical analyses of patterns in Supreme Court decision-making demonstrate that 
Thomas agrees with Rehnquist and Scalia in various categories of cases at rates as high as 
ninety percent.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 31, at 4. 
36 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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However, he did indicate his belief that “the President very well may 
have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our troops.”37  
He saw the presidential power to detain individuals in this case as 
flowing from the congressional enactment of the AUMF,38 which 
authorized the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.”39  Thomas’s 
position gave the four-member plurality (O’Connor, Rehnquist, 
Kennedy, and Breyer) the needed fifth vote to justify the president’s 
authority to detain individuals upon labeling them as enemy 
combatants.40  Notwithstanding Thomas’s allusion to inherent 
presidential authority to detain U.S. citizens,41 he relied on the AUMF as 
the source of the president’s authority and, therefore by implication, as a 
limitation on presidential power.  Although arguably Thomas’s reliance 
on AUMF is not an endorsement of plenary presidential authority to 
detain U.S. citizens, as a practical matter Congress virtually always falls 
into line with the president’s wishes when the executive asserts a need to 
use American military power to counteract a perceived enemy.42  Under 
Thomas’s vision of presidential authority in wartime eras and threats to 
national security, judicial review, such as that requested by Hamdi 
                                                 
37 Id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
38 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the plurality that we need not decide that 
question because Congress has authorized the President to [detain those arrayed against 
our troops through the Authorization for Use of Military Force]”). 
39 Id. at 2635. 
40 The justices concurring in part and dissenting in part (Ginsburg and Souter) and the 
other dissenting justices (Scalia and Stevens) did not agree that the AUMF gave the 
president the authority to undertake such detentions of American citizens.  Id. at 2671 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 2653 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
41 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
42 At the outset of the Vietnam War, for example:  
[The United States] provoked the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964, 
the clashes between torpedo boats of Hanoi’s navy and U.S. Navy 
destroyers, which [President Lyndon] Johnson used to trick the Senate 
into giving him an advance declaration of war for the far higher level 
of force he had decided by then he was probably going to have to 
employ to bend Hanoi to his will. 
NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE:  JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN VIETNAM 379 
(1988).  Although Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution after the Vietnam War in 
an ostensible effort to prevent presidents from involving U.S. troops in hostilities without 
congressional authorization, “[s]ome critics of the legislation claimed that it did not restrict 
presidential power as much as extend a free hand to wage war for up to sixty days.”  
KENNETH JANDA ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 645 (7th ed. 2002).  As observers 
note, “[t]he actual impact of the War Powers Resolution is probably quite minimal . . . .  
[Presidents] have all questioned its constitutionality, and no president has ever been 
punished for violating its provisions.”  Id. 
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concerning his detention, appears to be the only practical check on 
assertions of power by the president.  Because Thomas argues against 
the existence or assertion of judicial power in such situations, his 
position comes close to the endorsement of unfettered executive 
authority. 
Justice Thomas purported to rely on his originalist philosophy by 
stating that “[t]he Founders intended that the President have primary 
responsibility—along with the necessary power—to protect the national 
security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations.”43  He linked this 
deference to the executive’s discretionary authority in wartime to the 
highest priority to be placed on the value of national security.44  His 
opinion also emphasized the judiciary’s lack of capability to make 
decisions concerning issues involved with national security45 and the 
corresponding need for judges to show deference to decisions by 
executive officials.46 
When Thomas addressed the consistency of his positions with the 
constitutional protection against being “deprived of . . . liberty . . . 
without due process of law,”47 he effectively dismissed any practical 
protections that could flow from the Due Process Clause by declaring: 
In this context, due process requires nothing more than a 
good-faith executive determination.  To be clear:  The 
Court has held [in prior cases] that an executive, acting 
pursuant to statutory and constitutional authority may, 
consistent with the Due Process Clause, unilaterally 
                                                 
43 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2675 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
44 According to Thomas’s opinion, “It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental 
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.’”  Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 
500, 509 (1964)). 
45 In Thomas’s words, “with respect to certain decisions relating to national security and 
foreign affairs, the courts simply lack the relevant information and expertise to second-
guess determinations made by the President based on information properly withheld.”  Id. 
at 2676 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
46 Even when Thomas sees a decision-making role for the judiciary, those decisions are 
to be deferential.  He has stated: 
I acknowledge that the question whether Hamdi’s executive detention 
is lawful is a question properly resolved by the Judicial Branch, though 
the question comes to the Court with the strongest presumptions in 
favor of the Government . . . . [W]e lack the information and expertise 
to question whether Hamdi is actually an enemy combatant, a question 
the resolution of which is committed to other branches. 
Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
47 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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decide to detain an individual if the executive deems 
this necessary for the public safety even if he is mistaken.48 
Because Thomas would grant to the executive “an authority that 
includes making virtually conclusive factual findings” about the need to 
detain individuals,49 it is difficult to see how Thomas gives any weight to 
the value of the liberty interest emphasized by the framers.50  Indeed, he 
specifically declined to balance individuals’ liberty interests against the 
national security claims put forward by the executive as part of his 
analysis in the case.51  He only engaged in the exercise of undertaking a 
balancing analysis as a means to refute the reasoning of the plurality 
opinion after he had already stated his own conclusions about the 
executive’s virtually unfettered authority.  In undertaking this exercise, 
he clearly states that executive claims about national security threats 
trump any protections purported to exist in the Due Process Clause: 
Undeniably, Hamdi has been deprived of a serious interest, one 
actually protected by the Due Process Clause.  Against this, however, is 
the government’s overriding interest in protecting the nation.  If a 
deprivation of liberty can be justified by the need to protect a town, the 
protection of the nation, a fortiori, justifies it.52 
Although the foregoing statement purports to present how Thomas 
would balance the interests at stake if he believed that a balancing test 
was appropriate, his formulation does not accurately reflect the 
implications of the analysis he articulated earlier in the opinion that 
actually shaped his decision.  His use of the word “justified” might be 
perceived to imply that the executive is actually required to either 
present persuasive evidence about the danger posed by a specific 
individual or that the evidence presented must, in fact, be accurate in 
identifying the individual as presenting a danger.  In fact, neither 
                                                 
48 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2680-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
49 Id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
50 See infra text accompanying notes 124-143. 
51 Thomas stated: 
I conclude that the Government’s detention of Hamdi as an enemy 
combatant does not violate the Constitution.  By detaining Hamdi, the 
President, in the prosecution of a war and authorized by Congress, has 
acted well within his authority.  Hamdi thereby received all the 
process to which he was due under the circumstances.  I therefore 
believe that this is no occasion to balance the competing interests, as 
the plurality unconvincingly attempts to do. 
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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implication need be true according to the analysis presented by Thomas.  
Hamdi’s detention was justified by the government through the Mobbs 
Declaration, a recitation of statements by a Special Advisor to the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy alleging that Hamdi “affiliated with a 
Taliban military unit and received weapons training.”53  Moreover, 
Thomas had already indicated that it did not matter whether these 
unsubstantiated statements were true.54  Thus, a more accurate 
paraphrasing of Thomas’s conclusion would be as follows:  “If a 
deprivation of liberty can be rationalized by untested and 
unsubstantiated statements by the Government, an indefinite, 
incommunicado detention is permissible, whether or not those justifying 
statements were accurate.”  Clearly, Thomas’s analysis gave scant 
attention to the framers’ emphasis on individual liberty in the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
III.  CONSISTENCY 
More so than any other contemporary justice, “Thomas consistently 
advocates the strict application of key tools for interpreting the 
Constitution:  its text and history.”55  He sees himself as a principled 
decision maker with a consistent, coherent judicial philosophy.56  
Because Thomas seeks to distinguish himself from “the other justices 
[who] appear to engage in ad hoc decision making as they react to the 
legal issues that confront them in each individual case,”57 his opinions 
invite analysis regarding consistency and contradictions.  This section 
will examine whether Thomas’s opinion in the Hamdi case is consistent 
with his judicial philosophy and his reasoning in prior cases. 
A. Philosophical Orientation Toward Diminishing Judicial Activity and 
Power 
Justice Thomas emphasized that judges lack the capability to 
determine whether Hamdi should be labeled as an “enemy combatant,”“ 
and therefore, the judiciary should step aside in order to permit other 
branches of government to handle matters related to national security.58  
This denigration of judicial capacity and desire for a diminution of 
judicial activity are consistent with his underlying belief that the 
                                                 
53 Id. at 2637. 
54 See supra text accompanying note 48. 
55 Smith, supra note 9, at 48. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2676, 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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judiciary “exercises excessive power,” and thus “he “seeks to restore the 
democratic equilibrium that, in his view, the Constitution’s Framers 
intended.”59  Indeed, this philosophical orientation underlies his 
advocacy of originalism because he “believes that fidelity to text and 
history will keep judges faithful to the law and prevent them from 
imposing their personal values on society.”60 Justice Thomas emphasized 
this theme in other decisions, including his implicit criticism of judges’ 
excessive intrusion into public policy when he attacked a prisoners’ 
rights opinion as “yet another manifestation of the pervasive view that 
the Federal Constitution must address all ills in our society.”61 
B. Purported Adherence to Legal Principle Without Regard for Social Reality 
1. Thomas and Social Reality 
Because Thomas aspires to follow a principled judicial philosophy of 
constitutional interpretation by original intent, he has been described as 
“a voice for a formal, even rigid approach to constitutional 
interpretation, a rejection of the idea that modern influences might cast a 
new light on the intentions of the Framers.”62  While other justices 
frequently indicate that the potential consequences of their decisions on 
people’s lives can influence their analysis of issues,63 Thomas insists that 
the Court is “bound by the text of the Constitution and by the intent of 
those who drafted and ratified it.”64  With respect to constitutional rights, 
for example, Thomas says: 
                                                 
59 Smith, supra note 9, at 50. 
60 Id. 
61 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
62 David J. Garrow, On Race, It’s Thomas v. An Old Ideal, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at E1. 
63 For example, with respect to the applicability of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment to convicted offenders in prison, Thomas states flatly 
that the framers “simply did not conceive of the Eighth Amendment as protecting inmates 
from harsh treatment.”  Hudson, 505 U.S. at 19-20 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Therefore, he 
espouses the idea that the Eighth Amendment should not even be used to examine 
conditions of confinement.  Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).  By contrast, other justices, such as 
Justice Stevens, emphasize looking at the social reality of prison conditions in order to 
determine whether they are “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.  For 
example, in examining conditions in isolation cells at an Arkansas prison, Justice Stevens 
focused on aspects of actual conditions:  “It is equally plain, however, that the length of 
confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional 
standards.  A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of ‘grue’ might be tolerable for a few days 
and intolerably cruel for weeks and months.”  Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978). 
64 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 370-71 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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It is a bedrock principle of judicial restraint that a right 
be lodged firmly in the text or tradition of a specific 
constitutional provision before we will recognize it as 
fundamental.  Strict adherence to this approach is 
essential if we are to fulfill our constitutionally assigned 
role of giving full effect to the mandate of the Framers 
without infusing the constitutional fabric with our own 
political views.65 
As one manifestation of his aspiration to create principled decisions 
based entirely on the words and original intent of the Constitution, 
Thomas castigates the use of social science evidence by judges in making 
decisions.66  Social science attempts to use scientific methods to describe 
and analyze social reality,67 including counting and classifying 
observable objects and phenomena,68 in order to gain “an empirically 
based understanding”69 of people and the world in which they live.  
According to Thomas, “[t]he lower courts should not be swayed by the 
easy answers of social science, nor should they accept the findings, and 
the assumptions, of sociology and psychology at the price of 
constitutional principle.”70 
The foregoing description of Thomas’s aspirations for judicial 
decision making should not be perceived to mean that he never takes 
facts into account in making decisions.  In supporting an individual’s 
claim about a violation of the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines 
Clause, the amount of money in question was apparently relevant to 
Thomas’s decision since the framers did not give adequate guidance on 
the definition of the word “excessive.”71  Indeed, Thomas sometimes 
attempts to influence decisions by putting forth his own conclusions 
                                                 
65 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
66 For example, in considering an equal protection issue, Thomas wrote that “[t]he 
judiciary is fully competent to make independent determinations concerning the existence 
of state action without the unnecessary and misleading assistance of the social sciences.”  
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
67 The collection of data in social science is based primarily on observation, experiments, 
and surveys.  See STEVEN VAGO, LAW AND SOCIETY 292-305 (3d ed. 1991). 
68 For example, the quantitative methods in social science can facilitate the collection of 
data so that it is comprehensive, precise, efficient, and reliable.  THOMAS R. HENSLEY ET AL., 
THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT:  CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES  866 (1997). 
69 RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 1 
(1986). 
70 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122-23 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
71 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998) (involving a traveler at an 
international airport who forfeited $357,000 in cash being carried in a suitcase for failing to 
file a form declaring the transportation of the cash out of the country). 
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about social reality, even though his conclusions may be either 
unsubstantiated by evidence72 or demonstrably incorrect.73  As indicated 
by these examples, Thomas is not completely consistent in rejecting 
considerations of social reality.  However, because he emphasizes the 
principle of fealty to original intent, he often disregards the practical 
consequences of decisions, and therefore his refusal to acknowledge or 
consider the potential impact of his conclusions in the Hamdi case is 
consistent with his approach to judicial decision-making. 
2. The Risk of Error in Choosing Individuals for Indefinite Detention 
In the Hamdi case, Thomas’ gave scant attention to any aspects of 
social reality that might raise concerns about practical risks to 
individuals from indefinite, incommunicado detention based on the 
government’s discretionary decisions.  Thomas purports to rely on facts 
in characterizing the government’s actions as “detaining an enemy 
soldier” in order to “gather critical intelligence regarding the intentions 
and capabilities of our adversaries.”74  Yet Thomas does not require the 
government to substantiate its claim that the individual is, in fact, an 
enemy soldier and, moreover, Thomas would permit indefinite 
detentions even when the government wrongly labeled an American as 
an enemy.75 
After the government labeled detained individuals as “unlawful 
combatants” and began to send them from Afghanistan to Guantanamo 
Bay,76 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld justified their 
                                                 
72 Thomas has asserted, for example, without any supporting evidence that it can be 
“reasonably surmised, without direct evidence in any particular case, that all-white juries 
might judge black defendants unfairly.”  Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
73 With respect to the currently outlawed practice of mandatory death sentences for first-
degree murder and other crimes, Thomas has said, “One would think, however, that by 
eliminating explicit jury discretion and treating all defendants equally, a mandatory death 
penalty scheme was a perfectly reasonable legislative response to the concerns [about racial 
discrimination and arbitrariness] expressed in Furman.”  Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 
487 (1993) (referring to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).  Social science knowledge 
about judicial processes indicates, however, that mandatory sentences cannot eliminate 
racial discrimination because prosecutors still possess discretion to determine which 
defendants will be charged with capital crimes, juries possess discretion about whether to 
convict or, sometimes, find guilt for a lesser offense, and judges make discretionary 
decisions about evidentiary issues, jury selection, and other matters that can make similarly 
situated cases produce divergent results.  Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and 
Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797, 830 (1990). 
74 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2683 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
75 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50. 
76 CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:  MYTHS & REALITIES 197 (2004). 
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incommunicado detentions by characterizing them as “people [who] 
were involved in an effort to kill thousands of Americans . . . .  These are 
very tough, hard-core, well-trained terrorists.”77  Brigadier General 
Michael Lehnert, the commander of the Guantanmo Bay prison, labeled 
the detainees as “the worst of the worst.”78  Despite these drastic, 
categorical declarations reflecting the government’s labeling and 
treatment of suspected terrorists, by the time that the Supreme Court 
decided the Hamdi case in 2004, the government had released at least 119 
of these supposedly “hard-core, well-trained terrorists.”79  It turned out 
that dozens of these individuals who were detained without rights for 
two years were not Taliban soldiers and had actually been kidnapped by 
warlords in Afghanistan who told Americans officials that these 
individuals were supporters of the Taliban or al Qaeda in order to collect 
bounty money from the U.S. government.80  Despite this available 
information about the fallibility of the government’s judgments 
concerning suspected terrorists, Thomas would grant the executive 
unlimited authority to undertake mistaken detentions without any 
possibility of judicial review and correction. 
The hyperbolic nature of the government’s statements about 
detainees became even clearer within months after the Supreme Court’s 
Hamdi decision when the government released Hamdi and deported him 
to Saudi Arabia rather than participating in any judicial processes to 
justify his detention.81  Hamdi’s release conveyed the impression that the 
drastic characterizations about the need to hold him in incommunicado 
detention and the government’s dogged determination to fight the case 
through every level of the federal court system had more to do with the 
desire to gain judicial endorsement of unfettered executive power than 
with any actual danger that Hamdi posed to the United States. 
                                                 
77 U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Media Stakeout at 
NBC, Jan. 20, 2002, available at www.dod.mil/transcripts/2002/t01222002_t0120so.html. 
78 Esther Schrader, Response to Terror; Base Awaits ‘the Worst of the Worst,’ L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 2002, available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/99034514.html. 
79 Int’l Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, Defense Department Releases 26 
More Detainees from Guantanamo, Mar. 16, 2004, available at usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/ 
2004/Mar/17-436215.html. 
80 Nancy Gibbs & Viveca Novak, Inside “‘The Wire,’” TIME, Dec. 8, 2003, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1006372,00.html. 
81 Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia; U.S. Citizen’s Detention as Enemy 
Combatant Sparked Fierce Debate, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A02. 
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3. Incommunicado Detention and the Risk of Torture 
The practical risks of unlimited executive authority were also 
illustrated by oral arguments in the Hamdi case and events that followed 
soon after it.  Incommunicado detention is not merely a threat to 
individual liberty; it also raises risks that the government will employ 
torture or impose inhumane conditions of confinement.82  Indeed, the 
United States has been hiding nearly two dozen high-profile terrorism 
suspects from the International Committee of the Red Cross at 
undisclosed overseas locations, apparently so that no one can learn about 
the interrogation techniques and conditions of confinement being 
applied to these individuals who are believed to possess valuable 
information.83  During oral arguments, Paul D. Clement, the deputy 
solicitor general, responded to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s question of 
whether the government could punish or shoot detainees since the 
government claims that these individuals are not entitled to any rights in 
part by saying, “We couldn’t take somebody like Hamdi, for example, 
now that he’s been removed from the battlefield and is completely—
poses no threat unless he’s released, and use that kind of force on him.”84  
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg subsequently asked:  “Suppose the 
executive says, ‘“Mild torture, we think, will help to get this 
information?’”  It’s not a soldier who does something against the code of 
military justice, but it’s an executive command.  Some systems do that to 
get information.”85 
In response to the query from Ginsburg, Clement said, “Well, our 
executive doesn’t [use torture],” and he later added, “[T]he fact that 
executive discretion in a war situation can be abused is not a good and 
sufficient reason for judicial micromanagement and overseeing that 
authority . . . . [Y]ou have to trust the executive to make the kind of 
quintessential judgments that are involved in things like that.”86 
                                                 
82 Indeed, evidence emerged that the United States employed torture techniques in 
attempting to gain information from some terrorism suspects, such as “waterboarding” 
subjects by thrusting them headfirst into water and holding them there so that they believe 
they will drown.  Suzanne Goldenberg, U.S. Forces Were Taught Torture Techniques, THE 
GUARDIAN, May 14, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/ 
0,3604,1216438,00.html.   
83 Jon Manel, U.S. Hides High-Profile Prisoners, BBC NEWS, May 21, 2004, available at 
news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3736157.stm. 
84 Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court Asks:  Who Will Guard the Guardians?, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 9, 2004, § 4, at 7.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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A few hours after Clement denied that the government uses torture, 
the CBS program 60 Minutes II broadcast footage of Iraqi detainees in 
Abu Ghraib prison being humiliated and abused by American military 
personnel.87  Stories and pictures about abuses at Abu Ghraib dominated 
television and newspaper stories in the weeks that followed and were 
undoubtedly seen by the justices at the Supreme Court.88  In addition, as 
the justices drafted their opinions before issuing the Hamdi decision on 
June 28, 2004, news reports revealed that attorneys in the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel had sent the White House memos 
saying that the use of torture on suspected terrorists “may be justified” 
and that international laws against torture “may be unconstitutional.”89  
The memos define interrogation methods as constituting torture only 
when they cause extreme harms, such the infliction of pain equivalent in 
intensity to “severe physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of 
bodily function, or even death” or psychological harm that lasts for 
“months or even years.”90  This definition permits significantly more 
harsh and painful interrogation methods than those permitted under the 
definitions of torture in international law, such as the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel or Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.91  News reports also revealed that the CIA 
had used these memos as the basis for approving more aggressive 
interrogation techniques by its agents.92  In sum, at the same time that 
the lawyers representing the government before the Supreme Court 
denied that the executive branch would participate in the torture of 
detainees, other lawyers advising the president were endorsing just such 
actions, and these endorsements apparently contributed to the use of 
torturous interrogation techniques that violate international law.93 
                                                 
87 Warren Richey, When Do News Reports Influence Those in Black Robes?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Jul. 7, 2004), available at www.csmonitor.com/2004/0707/p02s02-usju.html. 
88 Id. 
89 Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush, WASH. POST, Jun. 9, 
2004, at A03. 
90 Id. 
91 See Association for the Prevention of Torture Paper, Compilation Under International 
Law:  Definition of Torture, May 11, 2001, available at www.apt.ch/un/definition.shtml 
(“‘[T]orture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession.”). 
92 Allen & Priest, supra note 89, at A03. 
93 See, e.g., The Torture Memos Series:  Editorials, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jun. 13, 2004, at 2P, 
available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/650526751.html (“But an ever-
expanding body of evidence shows that the president, vice president, defense secretary and 
attorney general sought ways to defend the use of abusive tactics on the part of American 
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Observers speculated that the availability of information about 
American complicity in torture and its stark refutation of the 
government’s claims that it could be trusted to treat detainees in a 
proper and humane fashion might affect the justices’ assessment of 
Hamdi’s case and the attendant risks of indefinite incommunicado 
detention.94  After all of the news reports on torture during the Court’s 
deliberation period, “in the end, only one justice, Clarence Thomas, fully 
embraced the administration’s ‘trust us’ argument.”95  Justice Thomas’s 
position in the Hamdi case provides further evidence of his desire to 
exclude any consideration of the practical consequences of judicial 
decisions on actual human beings, no matter how torturous those 
consequences may be. 
4. The Infinite Duration of the “War” on Terrorism 
Justice Thomas also implies the potential existence of a practical 
limitation on the executive power endorsed by his opinion through 
characterizing the power as existing “in the war context.”96  However, 
this qualifying phrase provides no realistic limitation on the extent and 
duration of executive power, as noted by one commentator: 
The war on terrorism is being waged against a hidden 
enemy who is not going to surrender in a ceremony 
aboard the USS Missouri.  There is indeed no way to 
foresee how or when this war will end.  The fear of 
terrorism may well go on for the rest of our lives.97 
Moreover, Thomas also indicates that he would take a broad, 
deferential view of the circumstances that justify detentions, and he 
would not tie the president’s power to the continuation of active military 
actions: 
[T]he plurality relies primarily on Article 118 of the 
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War . . . for the proposition that “[i]t is a 
clearly established principle of the law of war that 
detention may last no longer than active hostilities.”  It 
                                                                                                             
military personnel and intelligence agents that violate international law and American 
tradition.”). 
94 See Richey, supra note 87. 
95 Id. 
96 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2684 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
97 Anthony Lewis, Security and Liberty:  Preserving the Values of Freedom, in THE WAR ON 
OUR FREEDOMS 50-51 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003). 
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then appears to limit the President’s authority to detain 
by requiring that the record establis[h] that United States 
troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan 
because, in that case, detention would be “part of the 
exercise of ‘necessary and appropriate force.’”  But I do 
not believe that we may diminish the Federal 
Government’s war powers by reference to a 
treaty . . . . [W]e are bound by the political branches’ 
determination that the United States is at war . . . . And, 
in any case, the power to detain does not end with the 
cessation of formal hostilities.98 
Thus, in Thomas’s view, the duration of the extensive powers of the 
president during wartime, including the power to detain American 
citizens without any access to the courts, is defined by Congress and the 
president, regardless of practical circumstances concerning the existence 
of active combat or other military operations. 
5. Unfettered Wartime Authority and the Lessons of History 
Although Thomas presents himself as relying on history in his 
approach to constitutional interpretation,99 his Hamdi opinion evinces 
little recognition of the realities of American history.  The United States 
has repeatedly experienced wartime episodes in which the government 
asserted the authority to override the liberty and rights of individuals in 
the name of national security.100  However, retrospective analyses of 
                                                 
98 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
99 Smith, supra note 9, at 48. 
100 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Justices Who Won’t “‘Run with the Wolves,”‘ L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2004, at B9. 
In time of war, Americans have too often responded to fear and 
anxiety by harshly restricting constitutional liberties. 
 At the end of the [eighteenth] century, for example, when the 
nation faced the threat of war with France, the government enacted the 
Sedition Act of 1798, which effectively made it a crime for any person 
to criticize the president, Congress or government of the United States. 
 During the Civil War, President Lincoln repeatedly suspended 
the writ of habeas corpus, allowing as many as 38,000 individuals to be 
seized and imprisoned by military authorities without any recourse to 
judicial review. 
 During World War I, the government enacted the Espionage Act 
of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 to quell antiwar dissent.  More 
than 2,000 opponents of the war were prosecuted. 
 In World War II, the United States interned nearly 120,000 people 
of Japanese descent, 90,000 of whom were American citizens, 
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governmental actions against Japanese-Americans during World War II, 
the Cold War period of McCarthyism, or other “wars” consistently lead 
to the following conclusion:  “[T]he history of civil liberties in times of 
emergency suggests that governments seldom react to crises carefully 
and judiciously.  They acquiesce to the most alarmist proponents of 
repression.”101  Justice Thomas rejects considerations of social reality in 
favor of judicial decision making based on legal principles,102 but his 
approach simultaneously blinds him to the practical implications of 
history and the potential impact of his principles on the lives of his 
fellow Americans. 
Justice Thomas’s lack of consideration for the practical risks and 
problems of his Hamdi opinion is consistent with his espoused approach 
to constitutional interpretation that focuses on purported constitutional 
principles rather than social reality.  However, the nature of the risks and 
problems attendant to this view, such as erroneous detentions, torture, 
and perpetual unfettered executive authority in a “war” without end, 
highlight the potential for significant adverse consequences for many 
people if the Court had followed Thomas’s formalistic approach. 
C. Disregard for the Treatment and Fates of Individuals Held in Custody 
As indicated by the previous discussion of risks of erroneous 
detentions and torture,103 Thomas’s opinion in Hamdi showed little 
concern for the fates and treatment of individuals detained by executive 
fiat.  His opinions in cases concerning convicted criminal offenders 
                                                                                                             
removing them from their homes and relocating them in crude 
concentration camps. 
 During the Cold War, the U.S., fearful of Soviet espionage and 
sabotage, fell into a mindless witch hunt implemented through brutal 
legislative investigations, pervasive blacklists and criminal 
prosecutions. 
 During the Vietnam War, the government aggressively infiltrated 
antiwar organizations to disrupt and neutralize the antiwar 
movement.  The FBI compiled files on more than half a million 
Americans purely because of their opposition to the nation’s policy in 
Vietnam. 
Id. 
101 Alan Brinkley, A Familiar Story:  Lessons from Past Assaults on Freedoms, in THE WAR ON 
OUR FREEDOMS 45 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003). 
102 For example, Thomas has criticized courts’ utilizing social science research concerning 
the detrimental impacts of racial segregation because he believes judicial decisions should 
rest entirely on legal principles.  See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“This approach not only relies upon questionable social science research 
rather than constitutional principle . . . .”). 
103 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50 and 75-81. 
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demonstrate a parallel absence of concern for individuals incarcerated in 
the American criminal justice system.104  In applying his original intent 
philosophy to the Eighth Amendment, Thomas says that the framers 
“simply did not conceive of the Eighth Amendment as protecting 
inmates from harsh treatment.”105  Thomas reiterated the point in 
writing: 
At a minimum, I believe that the original meaning of 
“punishment,” the silence in the historical record, and 
the 185 years of uniform precedent shift the burden of 
persuasion to those who would apply the Eighth 
Amendment to prison conditions.  In my view, that 
burden has not yet been discharged.106 
Thus Thomas and Scalia have been the lone dissenters in cases in 
which the other justices, including their usual philosophical ally Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, found in favor of prisoners’ Eighth 
Amendment claims.107  Indeed, Thomas argues, by implication, that 
prisoners should not even be granted a limited constitutional entitlement 
to medical care in prison when he says that he “seriously doubts”108 that 
the precedent establishing prisoners’ limited right was decided 
                                                 
104 For example, two of the Court’s other conservative justices, Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy, joined the majority’s opinion in Hope v. Pelzer by declaring that Alabama 
corrections officials lost any claim to qualified immunity when their conduct constituted an 
obvious violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause by 
chaining a prisoner to a hitching post in the prison yard.  536 U.S. 730, 731-32 (2002).  
According to the facts recounted by the Court: 
The guards made him take off his shirt, and he remained shirtless all 
day while the sun burned his skin.  He remained attached to the post 
for approximately seven hours.  During the 7-hour period, he was 
given water only once or twice and was given no bathroom breaks.  At 
one point, a guard taunted Hope about his thirst.  According to Hope’s 
affidavit:  “[The guard] first gave water to some dogs, then brought the 
water cooler closer to me, removed its lid, and kicked the cooler over, 
spilling the water onto the ground.” 
Id. at 734-35.  In his dissenting opinion arguing for qualified immunity to block a civil 
rights lawsuit by the prisoner, Thomas said, “[T]he Eighth Amendment violation in this 
case is far from ‘obvious.’”  Id. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
105 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
106 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
107 See, e.g., Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4 (prisoner beaten by corrections officers permitted to sue 
for Eighth Amendment violation despite the lack of a serious injury); Helling, 509 U.S. at 35 
(non-smoking prisoner placed in a small cell with a chain-smoking cellmate permitted to 
raise claim about potential health threat from environmental exposure to tobacco smoke). 
108 Helling, 509 U.S. at 37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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correctly.109  Thomas’s position with respect to medical care is 
problematic with respect to human consequences because “for prisoners, 
who, by virtue of their incarceration, could not obtain such services for 
themselves, . . . the deprivation of medical care can inflict pain and, in 
worst-case situations, lead to ‘physical torture or a lingering death.’”110 
Consistent with his view that Hamdi was not entitled to have access 
to the courts, Thomas is among the justices who has sought to limit 
access to habeas corpus for convicted offenders in American prisons.  In 
a case raising the issue of federal judges’ obligation to defer to state court 
findings rather than conduct de novo reviews in habeas corpus cases,111 
Thomas wrote the plurality opinion that was interpreted by scholars to 
“conclud[e] that the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Scalia would 
now adopt a deference rule for all the issues in habeas corpus cases.”112  
Even more revealing of Thomas’s desire to limit effective judicial review 
of prisoners’ cases was his opinion in McFarland v. Scott.113  Prior 
Supreme Court decisions emphasized that prisoners must file all of their 
claims in a single habeas petition and they cannot file successive 
petitions based on the discovery of new claims.114  Under a federal 
statute, capital defendants are entitled to legal representation in any 
“post conviction proceeding.”115  The majority of justices in McFarland 
said that such defendants can request counsel under the statute prior to 
filing their habeas petition in order to have professional assistance in 
preparing their one permitted petition containing constitutional 
claims.116  By contrast, Thomas’s dissenting opinion asserted that the 
Court was obligated to follow a literal interpretation of the statute, 
which, according to Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist, would require the 
prisoner to prepare and file the habeas petition on his own first, and 
request representation by counsel later.117  Many prisoners suffer from 
                                                 
109 Prisoners’ limited entitlement to medical care is merely a right to not have prison 
officials be “deliberately indifferent” to “serious medical needs.”  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  This right does not constitute an entitlement to good, prompt, or 
complete medical care.  See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY CORRECTIONS 
64-71, 208-214. 
110 SMITH, supra note 109, at 210. 
111 Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992). 
112 Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L REV. 2331, 2394 (1993). 
113 512 U.S. 849, 864-73 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
114 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). 
115 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000). 
116 McFarland, 512 U.S. at 858. 
117 Id. at 866 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In short, the terms of § 848(q)(4)(B) indicate that 
Congress intended that legal assistance be made available under the provision only after a 
habeas proceeding has been commenced by the filing of an application for habeas relief.”). 
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educational deficiencies, problems of literacy, and mental illnesses, and 
almost no prisoners have formal training in law.118  Thomas would 
effectively require that inadequate, doomed pro se petitions be filed 
before the provision of counsel, thereby assuring that potentially valid 
claims would be lost due to the rule against successive petitions.  In 
capital cases, the loss of valid constitutional claims could obviously have 
the most severe possible impact on the life of the incarcerated individual. 
IV.  CONTRADICTIONS 
Because Thomas aspires to make principled decisions by using the 
strict application of the Constitution’s text and history,119 he would 
appear to be better positioned to demonstrate consistency in his decision 
making than would “the other justices [who] appear to engage in ad hoc 
decision making.”120  Although many aspects of his Hamdi opinion are 
consistent with his other decisions, as indicated by the previous 
discussion, Thomas is not always completely consistent.121  Moreover, 
his Hamdi opinion includes elements that appear to clearly contradict his 
espoused philosophy and approach to decision-making. 
A. Liberty in the Constitution 
Thomas effectively rejects the larger principles underlying the 
Constitution concerning limited governmental power and the protection 
of individual liberty.  As described by Stephen Schulhofer, 
The central premise of government under law is that 
executive officials, no matter how well intentioned, 
cannot be allowed unreviewable power imprison a 
citizen . . . .  However much we respect the good 
intentions of the current attorney general and secretary 
of defense, such disregard for traditional checks and 
                                                 
118  
For example, in Florida’s prisons, more than fifty percent of the 
inmates were found to read at or below the sixth grade level . . . .  
Furthermore, in several states, there are significant proportions of 
inmates who are not fluent in English . . . .  A prisoner who has college 
level reading ability would still not be able to utilize a law library 
effectively without extensive training and experience in legal research 
and procedure. 
Christopher E. Smith, Examining the Boundaries of Bounds:  Prison Law Libraries and Access to 
the Courts, 30 HOW. L. J. 27, 34-35 (1987). 
119 Smith, supra note 9, at 48. 
120 Id. 
121 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
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balances is a recipe for bad mistakes and serious abuses 
of power.122 
Schulhofer characterizes limited government and individual rights, 
the concepts that are effectively rejected by Thomas’s opinion, as the 
“bedrock constitutional principles.”123 
Individual liberty stands out as a central value of the framers.  This 
value did not merely inspire Patrick Henry’s famous declaration “give 
me liberty, or give me death.”124  It also sparked the initiation of the 
Revolutionary War125 and found expression in the country’s founding 
documents, including the Declaration of Independence’s prominent 
inclusion of liberty among people’s “inherent and unalienable rights.”126  
In the words of legal historian Kermit Hall, “[t]he framers of the 
Constitution in 1787 worried incessantly about protecting liberty from 
encroaching governmental power . . . .”127  The founders of the United 
States were significantly influenced by the writings of various 
philosophers, such as John Locke, who “saw government—any 
government—as by nature hostile to liberty, and argued therefore that it 
should survive only on the tolerance of those whom it governed.”128  
Moreover, the founders, viewing themselves and their values as 
products of English history, saw their efforts as the continuation and 
preservation of a “tradition of liberty [that] stretched back to at least 
1215, when the English barons had forced King John to sign the Magna 
Cara or Greater Charter.”129 
The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution states the objective of  
“secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty for ourselves and our Posterity” as a 
primary goal of the new governing system.130  Liberty is given special 
emphasis and importance in the Preamble because “it is only with 
                                                 
122 Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances:  Discarding Bedrock Constitutional 
Principles, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS 98 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds. 2003). 
123 See Schulhofer, supra note 122, at 74. 
124 Patrick Henry, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death (Mar. 23, 1775), available at 
www.law.ou.edu/hist/henry.html. 
125 See, e.g., JANDA ET AL., supra note 42, at 60.  (“The taxation [without representation] 
issue became secondary [to the American colonists]; more important was the conflict 
between British demands for order and American demands for liberty.”). 
126 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 13 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1939). 
127 Kermit L. Hall, Framing the Bill of Rights, in BY AND FOR THE PEOPLE:  CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 17 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1991). 
128 MELVIN UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY:  A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 43 (1988). 
129 Hall, supra note 127, at 14. 
130 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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respect to liberty that a concern is explicitly indicated for ‘our Posterity’ 
as well as for ‘ourselves.’”131 Thus, liberty appears to be such an 
important value to the framers that “it seems to be something that 
people can believe they have a duty to preserve not only for themselves 
but also for those who follow them.”132 
Elsewhere in the original Constitution, the framers devoted scant 
discussion to protections for individuals.133  Despite the presence of very 
few references to individuals’ rights, the Constitution states specifically 
that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.”134  This emphasis reflects a clear desire to protect 
individuals’ liberty by preventing arbitrary, incommunicado detentions 
and making access to the courts available to detainees.135  Scholars have 
described habeas corpus as “the Great Writ of Liberty—the means by 
which English courts could enforce the ‘law of the land’ against 
governmental power.”136  Despite expressing opposition to the creation 
of a Bill of Rights, Alexander Hamilton emphasized that habeas corpus, 
along with the prohibitions on ex post facto laws and titles of nobility, 
“are perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism” than any 
other specific rights in state constitutions.137  Although the framers’ 
initial inclination was to adopt Alexander Hamilton’s view that the 
Constitution did not need a written Bill of Rights,138 they were 
sufficiently concerned about the liberty interests at stake in the 
government’s power to detain individuals that they placed the Habeas 
Suspension Clause in Article I of the Constitution to emphasize the 
                                                 
131 GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787:  A COMMENTARY 15 (1989). 
132 Id. 
133 The Bill of Rights was later added to the original Constitution because of critics’ 
concerns about the absence of specifically articulated protections for individuals in the 
nation’s foundational document.  HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 68, at 95. 
134 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
135 As described by Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, “Habeas corpus, a venerable 
English writ, had evolved during the seventeenth century into a means by which courts 
could review the legality of a prisoner’s confinement and order release in appropriate 
circumstances.”  MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND 
THE MODERN STATE 31 (1998). 
136 Yackle, supra note 112, at 2337. 
137 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). 
138 See id. at 437 (“I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent 
in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but 
would even be dangerous.”). 
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existence of a protection against detentions undertaken on arbitrary or 
otherwise inappropriate bases.139 
The first amendments added to the Constitution as the Bill of Rights 
“concretely articulated the Constitution’s aim of securing personal 
liberty.”140 Within these amendments, there are many examples of 
specific legal protections established to protect aspects of liberty.  For 
example, the Fifth Amendment seeks to protect against compelled self-
incrimination141 and against deprivations of life, liberty, or property 
imposed by the federal government without due process of law.142  The 
Sixth Amendment rights concerning criminal prosecutions impose 
various procedural requirements, including rights to trial, confrontation, 
and counsel, as a means to prevent arbitrary and unfair deprivations of 
liberty for people facing the prospect of punishment.143 
In light of this evidence of the importance of liberty as a preeminent 
value for the framers of the Constitution, one might expect Justice 
Thomas, the foremost advocate of fealty to the framers’ intentions, to be 
one of liberty’s greatest defenders in light of his outspoken advocacy of 
constitutional interpretation by original intent.  In fact, however, 
Thomas’s opinion completely overrides the framers’ emphasis on 
individual liberty by treating executive authority and claims of national 
security threats as the preeminent and nearly exclusive priorities. 
B. Hamdi , the Constitution, and the Framers’ Intent 
Thomas’s opinion in Hamdi looked for evidence of original intent 
and also cited the text of the Constitution.  However, the nature and 
strength of that evidence cast doubt on whether it genuinely supports 
Thomas’s absolutist endorsement of executive authority. 
The textual aspect of the Constitution cited by Thomas144 is Article 
II’s designation of the president as “the Commander in Chief of the 
                                                 
139 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
140 ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIL IDEALS:  CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 
135 (1997). 
141 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that none “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself . . . .”).  
142 Id.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies against the states, 
but the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only against the federal 
government.  BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 301 (1993). 
143 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
144 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2533, 2675 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Army and Navy.”145  This phrase, by itself, does not clearly convey an 
intention to grant to the president the authority to hold American 
citizens in indefinite, incommunicado detention on U.S. soil, so Thomas 
explained his reliance on the phrase through Supreme Court precedents 
concerning presidential power.146  Thomas brought forth language from 
prior opinions that speak about broad presidential power in time of war 
and perceived national security risks, such as Justice Robert Jackson’s 
1940’s era comment that “[i]t would be intolerable that courts, without 
the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of 
the Executive taken on information properly held secret.”147  Such 
reliance on precedent is awkward for Thomas because he repeatedly 
emphasizes that constitutional interpretation should rely on the text and 
the framers’ intent;148 this approach frequently leads Thomas to reject 
precedents and, in effect, advocate radical changes or wholesale 
reversals of established doctrines.149  Moreover, the author of a Thomas 
biography project, with which the justice cooperated, quotes Justice 
Scalia, who frequently joins Thomas’s opinions, as saying that Thomas 
“doesn’t believe in stare decisis, period.  If a constitutional line of 
authority is wrong, [Thomas] would say, let’s get it right.”150  
Meanwhile, Scalia says of himself, “I wouldn’t do that.”151  Thus, there is 
a question about whether Thomas’s efforts to use case precedent to 
support the limited textual reference available in the Constitution is 
actually consistent with his judicial philosophy and his usual method of 
interpretation. 
                                                 
145 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
146 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2676-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 
635 (1862); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) and citing United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).   
147 Chi. & S. Air Lines Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 8-10. 
149 For example, Thomas endorses tossing aside seven decades of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence in order to return to the late nineteenth century’s limitations on 
congressional power.  CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE 
THOMAS:  CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 155-56 (2000).  Justice 
Thomas also asserts the novel idea that there would be no Establishment Clause violation if 
a state established an official religion.  See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. 
Ct. 2301, 2327-33 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).  This assertion flies in the 
face of the Court’s precedents going back for more than four decades.  See HENSLEY ET AL., 
supra note 68, at 130-91.  Justice Thomas appears eager to reverse instantly a number of 
established precedents concerning such issues as affirmative action, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 349-78 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), prison 
conditions, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37-42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and 
abortion, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 980-1020 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
150 Cliff Sloan, Radical Justice, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 10, 2004), available at http://www.msnbc. 
msn.com/id/6672836/site/newsweek/. 
151 Id. 
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For evidence of original intent, Thomas looked to the Federalist 
Papers.  To support his endorsement of plenary presidential power, he 
quoted Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 23 as saying: 
[the power to protect the Nation] ought to exist without 
limitation:  Because it is impossible to foresee and define 
the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the 
correspondent extent & variety of the means which may 
be necessary to satisfy them.  The circumstances that 
endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this 
reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed 
on the power to which the care of it is committed.152 
Although this quotation appears to strongly support Thomas’s 
argument for unlimited executive authority, its presentation is deceptive 
because Thomas omitted the first sentence of the paragraph that he is 
quoting.  A complete quotation of the paragraph would include the 
following introductory sentence:   
The authorities essential to the care of the common 
defence are these—to raise armies—to build and equip 
fleets—to prescribe rules for thegovernment of both—to 
direct their operations—to provide for theirsupport.  
These powers ought to exist without limitation . . . .153 
In light of Hamilton’s actual words, the questions arise:  In which 
phrase does Thomas see support for presidential authority to impose 
indefinite, incommunicado detention on American citizens?  Is it a 
component of “prescrib[ing] rules” for “rais[ing] armies” and 
“equip[ping] fleets”?  Is it implied by the power to “direct th[e] 
operations” of armies and fleets?  Because Hamilton’s words seem 
specifically applied to creating and directing military forces, Thomas’s 
omission of the introductory sentence appears calculated to imply that 
Hamilton’s words endorsed plenary powers that could include 
unreviewable detentions of U.S. citizens.  Thomas’s actual conclusions 
about Hamilton’s support for detention powers seem much weaker 
when the entire quotation is read in context. 
Another problem arises because Thomas’s presentation of and 
reliance on Hamilton’s words in the Federalist Papers, a series of 
                                                 
152 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2675 (2004) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 112 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982) (emphasis in original)). 
153 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 112 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). 
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newspaper columns advocating ratification of the Constitution,154 seem 
to clash with the actual text of the Constitution.  Article I of the 
Constitution states that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the public Safety may require it.”155  If there is an apparent clash between 
a newspaper editorial being used to discern original intent and the 
explicit words of the Constitution, it would seem that Thomas would 
give greater weight to the text of the founding document.  In his opinion, 
Thomas gave greater weight to the primacy of national security than to 
the words and intentions of the Habeas Suspension Clause by arguing 
that there may be circumstances other than rebellion and invasion where 
national security requires detentions without remedy.156 
Thomas did not address the fact that Hamilton, the source of the 
framers’ intentions on whom he purports to rely, emphasizes the 
importance of access to habeas corpus as an essential protection for 
liberty in Federalist No. 84.157  According to Hamilton: 
[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonments have been in 
all ages the favorourite and most formidable 
instruments of tyranny.  The observations of the 
judicious Blackstone in reference to the latter, are well 
worthy of recital.  “To bereave a man of life (says he) or 
by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation 
or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of 
despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny 
throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the 
person by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his 
sufferings are unknown and forgotten, is a less public, a 
less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of 
arbitrary government.”  And as a remedy for this fatal 
evil, he is every where peculiarly emphatical in his 
encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which in one place 
he calls, “the BULWARK of the British constitution.”158 
In looking at both complete Hamilton quotations, the one partially 
presented by Thomas and the later one concerning habeas corpus, it 
might be easy to conclude that Hamilton’s words provide stronger 
                                                 
154 Id. at x. 
155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2. 
156 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2683. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
157 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 435-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). 
158 Id. (emphasis in original).   
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 4 [2005], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss4/1
2005] Justice Thomas and Incommunicado Detention 811 
support for the other justices’ conclusion that Hamdi is entitled to access 
to the courts than for Thomas’s argument that Hamilton endorses 
unfettered presidential authority to detain U.S. citizens. 
A further difficulty for Thomas’s reasoning is the fact that the 
Federalist Papers address the original Constitution and not the 
subsequently added provisions in the Bill of Rights that grant rights to 
due process and representation by counsel.  Indeed, Hamilton, Thomas’s 
source of original intent, expressed opposition to the creation of a bill of 
rights and therefore would not be an appropriate source for the framers’ 
later intentions concerning the Constitution’s liberty-protecting 
amendments.159  Thus, Thomas’s examination of original intent is 
incomplete because it omits consideration of many specific provisions of 
the Constitution that were added to the original document in order to 
articulate protections for various aspects of liberty. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Hamdi, Clarence Thomas distinguished himself as the lone justice 
who would grant the government virtually unfettered authority to label 
American citizens as “enemy combatants” and then hold them in 
indefinite incommunicado detention without any access to the courts 
and without any legal protections under the Constitution.  In many 
respects, Thomas’s opinion in Hamdi was consistent with themes and 
conclusions in his other opinions in which he seeks to limit judicial 
power, disregards social reality and the human consequences of judicial 
decisions, and minimizes legal protections for individuals held in 
government custody.  In other ways, however, his opinion in Hamdi 
seems inconsistent with his purported adherence to a judicial philosophy 
that emphasizes fealty to the Constitution’s text and the original 
intentions of the framers.  Despite frequently demonstrating disdain for 
obedience to Supreme Court precedents, Thomas’s Hamdi opinion relies 
heavily on precedents to make his case for plenary presidential power.  
In purporting to rely on the framers’ intentions, Thomas makes an 
incomplete and misleading presentation of Alexander Hamilton’s 
writings in order to overstate support for unfettered presidential 
authority while neglecting Hamilton’s words about the importance of 
habeas corpus to prevent arbitrary detentions.  Fundamentally, Thomas 
gives scant attention to the framers’ intent to emphasize the protection of 
individuals’ liberty in order to advance his preference for granting broad 
power to the government, even when it may result in the erroneous 
                                                 
159 See id. at 437. 
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detention of innocent Americans.160  Thus, Thomas’s Hamdi opinion 
provides support for Professor Mark Graber’s analysis of the justice, 
which concluded that Thomas “discards originalism completely when 
that philosophy is hostile to certain conservative interests . . . . Justice 
Thomas the originalist in theory fails to reduce judicial discretion by 
refusing to be a consistent originalist in practice.  History guides only 
some of his judicial opinions.”161 
Beyond the ways in which the Hamdi opinion illuminates general 
issues about the consistency of Thomas’s judicial decision-making, 
specific concerns arise when the Hamdi opinion is examined in light of 
the predicted impending retirement of Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist.162  In November 2004, President George W. Bush nominated 
White House counsel Alberto Gonzales to replace retiring U.S. Attorney 
General John Ashcroft.163  Gonzales was involved in crafting or 
approving legal memoranda that justified the use of torture by American 
officials as a means to gain information from suspected terrorists.164  
Similarly, Thomas’s Hamdi opinion contains no recognition or concern 
about the risks and realities of Americans’ use of and complicity in 
torture as part of the “war on terrorism.”165  Thus, the rumors of 
Thomas’s potential elevation to Chief Justice166 raise the disturbing 
possibility that the two most visible officials in the U.S. government with 
                                                 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 48-54. 
161 Graber, supra note 6, at 71, 88. 
162 See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. 
163 Dan Eggen, Gonzales Named to Succeed Ashcroft as Attorney General, WASH. POST, Nov. 
11, 2004, at A01. 
164 Id.; see also text accompanying notes 89-93. 
165 In addition to questions about torturous techniques used by American interrogators, 
the U.S. government also hands suspects to other countries that are known to use torture in 
order to gain their assistance in extracting information.  See Rafael Epstein, Detention and 
Interrogation Methods in the War on Terror, LOCAL RADIO-AUSTRALIA, Mar. 3, 2003, available at 
www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s796322.htm. 
After speaking to ten currently serving U.S. national security officials 
the Washington Post revealed the CIA’s interrogation or “stress and 
duress” techniques.  Blindfolded and manacled captives are kept 
standing or kneeling for hours.  They’re tied up in awkward, painful 
positions and they’re deprived of sleep, held in tiny rooms for days at 
a time. Those rooms are flooded with light or painfully loud noise.  
Some are beaten when they’re initially arrested, thrown into the walls 
while blindfolded . . . .  After questioning, if they don’t cooperate, 
they’re handed over, “rendered,” in official language, to foreign 
intelligence services in countries like Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt, 
countries where torture, including electrocution, has been 
documented. 
Id. 
166 See supra text accompanying notes 4-6. 
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responsibilities as the guardians and enforcers of law would be oblivious 
to abuses of the sort that are specifically condemned under international 
law.167  Thus, Thomas’s judicial opinions may have consequences not 
only for individual Americans who are detained by the U.S. government 
but also for the image of the American judiciary and governing system in 
the eyes of the world. 
                                                 
167 See United Nations, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Feb. 15, 1985), available at www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html. 
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